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Computer forensics has become an important technology in providing evidence in 
investigations of computer misuse, attacks against computer systems and more traditional 
crimes like money laundering and fraud where digital devices are involved. Investigators 
frequently perform preliminary analysis at the crime scene on suspects‟ devices to 
determine the existence of any inappropriate materials such as child pornography on them 
and conduct further analysis after the seizure of computers to glean leads or valuable 
evidence. Hence, it is crucial to design a tool which is portable and can perform efficient 
instant analysis. Many tools have been developed for this purpose, such as Computer 
Online Forensic Evidence Extractor (COFEE), but unfortunately, they become ineffective 
in cases where forensic data has been removed. In this thesis, we design a portable forensic 
tool which can be used to compliment COFEE for preliminary screening to analyze 
unallocated disk space by adopting a space efficient data structure of fingerprint hash 
tables for storing the massive forensic data from law enforcement databases in a flash drive 
and utilizing hash tree indexing for fast searching. We also apply group testing to identify 
the fragmentation point of the file and locate the starting cluster of each fragment based on 
statistics on the gap between the fragments. Furthermore, in order to retrieve evidence and 
clues from unallocated space by recovering deleted files, a file structure based carving 
algorithm for Windows registry hive files is presented based on their internal structure 
and unique patterns of storage.  
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The internet and digital devices like portable media players, smart phones and digital 
cameras are now being used by many different people for a variety of reasons. 
Unfortunately, criminals are also designing their own uses to assist them in committing 
their crimes. 
 
Law enforcement now has a great demand for investigators with a technology background 
to join the computer forensics field. This branch of forensic science is responsible for 
searching through and recovering evidence from digital sources. The evidence is not 
limited to files or emails found on a computer, but can be from any digital device that stores 
data. This field has become a vital tool in the fight against crime in cases where little or no 
physical evidence like DNA or fingerprints exists [1]. Unlike physical evidence, many 
crooks are aware of the digital trail they left behind and attempt to delete whatever evidence 
they can. For example, when the Enron scandal [2] surfaced in October 2001, top 
executives deleted thousands of e-mails and digital documents in an effort to cover up their 




erased. The space it occupies simply becomes available for use by other files which is also 
known as unallocated space. The less data added to the system after a file has been deleted 
greatly increases the possibility that the data can be recovered, even after long periods of 
time. But, as activities on the system increases, the likelihood that data can be fully 
recovered diminishes. This is because eventually these unallocated spaces will be 
re-assigned to other files.   
 
Forensic analysis of unallocated disk space has attracted the interest of many forensic 
investigators as it has played an important role in the computer forensics field bringing 
convictions to so many important criminal cases. In fact, one of the decade‟s most 
fascinating criminal trials against corporate giant Enron was successful largely due to the 
digital evidence in the form of over 200,000 emails and office documents recovered from 
computers at their offices.  
 
1.2 Motivations and Problem Statement 
 
Law enforcement agencies around the world collect and store large databases of digital 
evidence, also known as alert databases. Child pornography, for example, is collected and 
saved to assist in the arrest and prosecution of the pedophiles that possess them. It‟s also 




their abusers. In determining whether a suspect‟s computer contains inappropriate images, 
a forensic investigator compares the files from the suspect‟s device with these databases of 
known inappropriate materials. However, a simple bit-by-bit file comparison is very 
time-consuming due to the enormous size of today‟s storage devices. So a methodology for 
preliminary screening is essential to eliminate devices that are of no forensic interest. Also, 
as not every law enforcement agency has a specialized computer forensics agent, it is 
crucial that tools used for preliminary screening facilitate efficient forensic inspections. 
Some tools are available today which have these capabilities. One such tool, Computer 
Online Forensic Evidence Extractor (COFEE) [3], was created in 2008 by Microsoft. This 
software was created through a joint partnership with law enforcement [4] and is available 
at no cost for their use. This program is loaded on a USB flash drive, shown in Figure 1.1 
and brought to a crime scene by forensic investigators to perform forensic analysis of live 
computer systems. 
 
Figure 1.1 Computer Online Forensic Evidence Extractor (COFEE) [5] 
 
COFEE works by comparing hash values of files on the target device with those compiled 
and stored on the flash drive. As a result, it is increasingly prevalent in crime scenes or even 




between countries. In a recent scandal involving Richard Lahey [6], a former Bishop of the 
Catholic Church from Nova Scotia, Canada, the evidence of child pornography was 
discovered on his personal laptop by members of the Canada Border Agency during a 
routine border crossing check. Preliminary analysis of the laptop was first performed 
on-site and revealed images of concern which necessitated seizure of the laptop for more 
comprehensive analysis later. The results of the comprehensive analysis confirmed the 
presence of child pornography images and formal criminal charges were brought against 
Lahey as a result.  
 
Unfortunately, COFEE becomes ineffective in cases where forensic data has been removed 
from a device using simple methods like deleting viewed child pornography and emptying 
the Windows recycle bin. In these cases, COFEE cannot conduct a check on deleted files or 
unallocated spaces. This is a common occurrence in crime scenes where the suspect has had 
some prior warning of the arrival of law enforcement and attempted to hide evidence by 
deleting incriminating files. Fortunately, although deleted files are no longer accessible by 
the file system, their data clusters may be wholly or partially untouched and are recoverable. 
File carving is an area of research in digital forensics that focuses on recovering such files. 
Intuitively, one way to enhance COFEE to also analyze these deleted files (or unallocated 
spaces) is to first utilize a file carver to carve all deleted files and then run COFEE against 




especially when recovering files that are fragmented into two or more pieces, which is a 
challenge that existing forensic tools face. It is worth noting that recovering deleted files 
from a file system with residual file metadata is a simple task; many programs are available 
to the average home to do this. But, a savvy criminal can easily erase files in such a way 
that a tool which makes use of file system structure cannot recover. Hence, the recovery 
timeframe may not be suitable for the fast preliminary screening for which COFEE was 
designed. Another option is to enhance COFEE to perform direct analysis on all the data 
clusters on disk for both deleted and existing files. However this option is again hampered 
by the difficulty in parsing files fragmented into two or more pieces. 
 
Nevertheless, we can simply extract those unallocated disk spaces and leave those allocated 
spaces checked by COFEE. Then, similar to COFEE, we calculate the hash values for the 
data clusters of unallocated disk spaces. In order to cope with this design, each file in the 
database must be stored as multiple hash values instead of just one, like COFEE does. As a 
result, the required storage space needed to bring to the crime scene would limit the 
effectiveness of these tools. Suppose the alert database contains 10 million images which 
need to be compared with files found at a crime scene and suppose the source image files 
are 1MB in size on average, assuming that the cluster size is 4KB on the suspect device and 
the result of a secure hash algorithm used is 128-bit in length, we can estimate the size of 




of storage and a 512-bit hash algorithm such as SHA-512 would require 152.59GB (see 
Table 1). The larger the alert database, the larger storage space is needed for a USB drive 
such that 20 million images would require twice the storage previously calculated. 
Furthermore, several copies of alert database may be required due to the fact that different 
suspects‟ computers use different cluster sizes. 
Table 1.1 Required storage space for different methods of storing alert databases 












In this research, the focus is on designing a portable forensics tool which can be used to 
compliment COFEE for preliminary screening to analyze unallocated disk space. 
 
In addition to images, a computer system may contain several other items of interests to a 
forensic investigator: Internet browsing history, instant messaging history (Windows Live 
Messenger, Skype, Facebook), audit and log files, run command history and the Windows 
registry. This sort of data is stored in files either using complicated proprietary formats, 




analysis of these areas could yield many leads or valuable evidence to both criminal and 
civil cases. 
 
Some programs contain privacy settings which allow the user to remove any data which 
could later be used by someone else. The design of these features was to protect people 
using publicly available computers i.e. those in internet cafés, and hotel business centers. 
Nevertheless, the same tools can be used by criminals to hide their online activities by 
deleting browsing and searching history. On a Windows system, the Windows registry is 
the main storage area of the operating system (OS). It contains all the information the OS 
needs to track. This would include things like user accounts, file associations and way of 
tracking what the user has accessed. Previously typed URLs, previously accessed files, 
websites viewed, and run command history are all examples of the things stored in the 
Windows registry [7, 8]. Because of this, the registry is commonly manipulated or deleted 
by privacy tools or through manual means. Therefore, it is crucial to recover deleted 
Windows registry files during a digital investigation involving a Windows system if 
applicable after preliminary tests reveal suspicious activities where suspects have left. In 
the past, the recovery of a Windows registry heavily relies on file metadata. However, it 
becomes very challenging when Windows registry file metadata is missing, especially, 
because of the following reasons: 




b) Windows Registry files could be fragmented into hundreds of pieces, which makes 
currently existing file carving methods ineffective.  
 
A survey we conducted shows that the Windows Registry files of 52% of Windows 
systems we studied are fragmented. In other words, file fragmentation exists commonly on 
Windows Registry files. Additionally, as no PC has had the same set of files added, deleted, 
updated, or moved, the distribution of these fragments is completely random across the 
entire disk, even if a defragmentation program has been executed.  
 
In essence, we are also investigating how to effectively carve deleted Windows registry 
files out of unallocated disk space based on the internal structure of the Windows registry 
files as well as their unique patterns of storage. 
 
1.3 Objectives and Research Contributions 
 
The objective of this research focuses on designing an efficient evidence extracting method 
from unallocated space, which supplements COFEE, to help investigators extract evidence 
from a Windows computer. In addition, this study also aims to develop a novel file carving 





The contributions of researching an efficient evidence extracting method are twofold. First, 
we propose to use data structures based on hash tree index and Fingerprint Hash Table 
(FHT). The FHT is a well organized storage efficient data structure that can be applied to 
test the existence of a given element from a known set. The hash tree indexing structure 
ensures that the lookups are fast and efficient. Second, we apply group testing techniques 
based on statistics about the size of gaps between two fragments of a file [9] for effectively 
searching the unallocated space of the suspect‟s device to extract fragmented files that were 
permanently deleted. 
 
The novel file carving algorithm for Windows registry files is based on a survey of 50 
computer systems. The registry hive files on each computer were used to verify the 
structure of this data repository, which is designed by Microsoft but hasn‟t been released 
publicly. Additionally, we supplemented more newly discovered details to clarify the 
structure and the fragment characteristics based on the statistics from the survey to help us 
get a more accurate recovery result. Based on the survey result, we proposed a novel file 
carving algorithm for Windows registry files based on their internal structure and unique 
patterns of storage. It overcomes the challenges facing traditional file carving approaches 





1.4 Organization of Thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes related work. In Chapter 
3, we introduce the novel forensics analysis method for evidence extraction from 
unallocated space. Chapter 4 provides the novel file carving algorithm for Windows 
















Chapter 2 Related Work 
 
The increased use of digital devices in the developed world has led to the creation and rapid 
expansion of the Computer Forensics field of investigation within law enforcement. As 
more people, including criminals, use devices with digital storage capabilities, the 
discovery of such devices at crime scenes increases; as does the need to analyze these 
devices for evidence. 
 
Computer forensics is the “analysis including a manual review of material on the media, 
reviewing the Windows registry for suspect information, discovering and cracking 
passwords, keyword searches for topics related to the crime, and extracting e-mail and 
pictures for review” [10]. This science provides evidence for investigations in all types of 
crimes. This ranges from individuals who use personal computers for illegal purposes like 
child pornography or computer hacking, to groups of people who use multiple devices to 
commit crimes like money laundering and fraud. 
 
The disk analysis tools used by forensic investigators frequently examine the unallocated 
space of storage devices, often containing deleted files which are no longer referenced as 





In point of fact, when a file is permanently deleted in the file system, the file system no 
longer provides any means for retrieving the file and marks the clusters previously assigned 
to the deleted file as unallocated hence available for reusing by other files. Although the file 
appears to have been erased, its data is still largely intact until it is overwritten by another 
file. For example, in the FAT file system, each file or directory is allocated a data structure 
called a directory entry (DIR) that contains the file name, size, starting cluster address and 
other metadata. If a file is large enough to require multiple clusters, only the file system has 
the information to link one cluster to another in the right order thus form a cluster chain. As 
shown in Figure 2.1, File.txt has a size of 16000 bytes. Suppose that the cluster size is 8 
sectors (or 4096 bytes), File.txt occupies the clusters 36-39. We can see that the starting 
cluster address in the directory entry indicates the first cluster 36 of the file and the FAT 
structure has the cluster chain which connects all the remaining clusters of File.txt.  
Directory Entry Structures
File Name File Size
Starting Cluster 
Address






















When the file is deleted, the operating system only updates the DIR entry where the first 
byte of the directory entry (or the first character of the file name) is set to a special character 
(0xe5 in hex). At the same time, it changes the FAT entries for the rest clusters to “0”. But 
the operating system does not erase the actual contents of the data clusters. As shown in 
Figure 2.2, it shows its relevant remaining information in the system after File.txt (in the 
example of Figure 2.1) deleted from the system. The two cardinal changes are: in directory 
entry, “File.txt” updates to “_ile.txt” and the FAT cluster chain is wiped out.  
Directory Entry Structures
File Name File Size
Starting Cluster 
Address


















Figure 2.2 The file in unallocated state in hard disk 
 
Obviously, it is very straightforward to recover deleted files by using the remaining file 
metadata information in a FAT file system given that most of files are stored in contiguous 
blocks. First, we simply change the first character of the file name back to its original one. 
Then, we put back the cluster chain in FAT since we know the starting cluster address from 




Currently, there are a number of both open source and commercially available tools which 
allow the recovery of deleted or hidden files from within the unallocated spaces of a storage 
device. Tools such as EnCase [12], WinHex [13], and Forensic Toolkit [14] use a basic 
search of the file system for any residual data left after a file is deleted. These tools can 
identify how big a file is and where on the device the beginning of the file is located. These 
tools will recover the first cluster plus however many additional clusters are needed to 
match the size of the file. There is a small difference between how these tools will decide 
which of the additional clusters are needed. WinHex v11.25, for example, is able to blindly 
recover all clusters regardless of their allocation status in the file system. Other tools like 
EnCase, can pull only unallocated data from within the specific cluster chain as listed in the 
FAT [15]. These tools can be used for the most basic types of file recovery only. These 
tools represent a very basic form of data recovery; once the files becomes fragmented or 
lose their reference from within the file system‟s meta-data, the software won‟t be able to 
recover the files properly. 
 
Because of these limitations, a more complex software that doesn‟t rely on the file system‟s 
meta-data was created. Such “File Carving” software was designed to reconstruct files 
based solely on their contents. Similarly to the previously mentioned tools, when 
recovering non-fragmented files with a file carver, the process is very fast. Many files have 




this to recover data. The Foremost software package was developed first and it works by 
first creating a configuration file which contains file header information. It then tries to 
match each of the headers with a corresponding footer. Unfortunately, this software will 
repeatedly search through data that has previously been matched, increasing the length of 
time a few searches can take. Richard et al. proposed Scalpel [18] to fix this performance 
issue by creating a high performance multiple file systems carver. Foremost spent much of 
its time reading and writing to the hard drive, often the slowest piece in a computer system. 
The improved file carver, Scalpel, first indexes all headers and footers, then looks for 
potential matches from within that index which is stored in memory; a much faster method 
than repeatedly searching the hard drive. Additionally, the software also contains improved 
memory-to-memory copy operations, as well as faster byte writing output. These 
improvements made Scalpel a much more efficient file carving tool. These two tools, 
however, make no effort to validate the recovered data, so false positive header/footer 
matches result in corrupt file recoveries. 
 
Except for these well-known work based on header and footer recovering, many detailed 
work focusing on some specific file types have also been proposed, such as carving the 
RAR file [19], the PDF file [20]. Since RAR file is the most commonly archived file, the 
authors designed the carving algorithm based on the information and internal structure of 




comparing the size of the file in the RAR file with the distance between the header and 
footer of the RAR file or the file size to determine whether the file is fragmented. After 
they applied enumeration to reassemble the two fragments which were extracted, they 
implemented the CRC of decompressed data stored in the file header to validate the 
integrity of RAR file which is a good reminder for us to do the file validation after a file is 
extracted. 
 
All the tools previously discussed are great at the recovery of contiguously stored files, but 
issues arise when trying to recover files that have been split into multiple pieces and stored 
in different locations across on the disk. While the traditional set of meta-data based tools 
previously discussed become ineffective, file carving tools can still recover data. That 
being said there are challenges that must be overcome to recover these fragmented files.   
 
When a file is fragmented into two pieces, one piece contains the file header and the other 
file footer. In [9], this was identified as a bi-fragmented file. A new approach was proposed 
to recover this particular type of file, called bi-fragment gap carving, which is based on a 
dedicated survey. The survey from more than 300 hard drives used on the second hand 
market shows 50% of recovered fragmented files are bi-fragmented files. Moreover, the 
survey shows that the gap between the first fragment and the second fragment is a relatively 




where the file header and footer are located. The file header is considered the starting point 
of the first fragment and the file footer is considered the ending point of the second 
fragment. A gap, “G”, of sectors containing non relevant data must therefore exist between 
the two pieces of a bi-fragmented file. Once the program identifies the proper number of 
sectors to remove, the file can be properly recovered. An initial value of G is assigned and 
tested from either side of the gap. This value sequentially increases until the correct file 
sequence is found.  
 
For example, as shown in Figure 2.3, a bi-fragmented file takes up three clusters and the 
initial value assigned to G is 2. Step 1 begins with removing the first two clusters right after 
the file header. The remaining clusters would be concatenated and tested. When the test 
result of step 1 is negative, the algorithm moves one cluster forward and repeats its 
concatenation and testing; this would be step 2. This process repeats until the algorithm 
reaches the file footer. At this point the value of G would be increased and the process 
would restart removing the appropriate amount of clusters after the file header. In the 
example, when G has a value of 3, the third step would result in a positive match, and a 
proper extract of the file can be made. After the file is recovered, several object validation 




















Figure 2.3 Using gaps to concatenate the file 
 
Although this work proposes a promising carving algorithm, it assumes having the correct 
file header and footer. Moreover, all aforementioned file carvers become ineffective when 
dealing with files that have more than two fragments. The challenge in file carving turns 
out to be how to recover the file with more than two fragments. 
 
In recent years, several works focused their attention on those files with more than two 
fragments. For example, Memon et al. [21] created a vertex disjoint graph which 
reassembled the fragments by ordering them according to the compared weights of the 
clusters from all the potential fragments, where the weight of two clusters indicates how 
likely they are physically adjacent. In order to reconstruct the file, they introduced the 




different algorithms for reassembling the fragments based on this greedy heuristic. The best 
of which, the greedy parallel unique path (PUP) algorithm, reconstructed the file without 
relying on the order of the images being reconstructed.  
 
Based on Memon et al‟s previous work, in 2008, Pal et al. [22] presented detecting file 
fragmentation point using sequential hypothesis to detect the fragmentation point of a file 
by sequentially comparing adjacent pairs of blocks from the first block of the file until the 
fragmentation point is detected. As the solution in Garfinkel‟s paper [9] repeated, decoding 
is the method to identify the starting point of the next fragment of the file. In order to 
recover the file with multiple fragments, they refined the file carver by combining the 
modified parallel unique path algorithm (PUP) with sequential hypothesis testing (SHT) to 
retrieve multiple fragmented files. 
 
In order to decrease the highly intensive method of looking for the starting block of the 
remaining fragments, Memon et al. proposed [23] an algorithm based on bit sequence 
matching to distinguish fragments generated by the same Huffman code tables. First, they 
clearly defined the JPEG file format. Then, based on the internal structure, they designed an 
algorithm which compares entropy-coded data of the fragment bit sequences generated by 
the same Huffman code tables to find the file fragments. This reduced the complexity of the 




Although the method of looking for the starting block of the next fragment is the same as 
Garfinkel‟s work [9], this bit sequence matching can work on fragmented files with missed 
fragments, something Garfinkel‟s method could not solve.  
 
The above-mentioned work mainly focuses on how to carve out an image file stored in 
various places on the disk. There is additional work which has proposed file carving for 
PDF, RAR, IE and audit log files. Missing, or at least lacking, are papers discussing the 
Windows registry hive files. These are the operating system‟s main data repository. And 
not surprisingly, they can contain direct evidence or at least clues a forensic investigator 
can use. Available research related to a Windows registry is limited. In [24], the author 
gives a brief overview of the internal structure of the Windows registry. This is the first 
explanation of the registry based on both physical and logical data units.  
 
Following that, Morgan published [25] which is a more complicated review of the 
Windows NT registry file format. Based on the information from this work, Morgan [26] 
explained how Windows deletes the registry data, then provided the algorithm to recover 
deleted cells; the basic unit the Windows registry uses to store its data. Jolanta 
Thomassen‟s thesis [27] described a process that uses the very low-level binary 
information of registry hive files to analyze the unallocated space for recovering remnants 




Thomassen‟s work directly focuses on extracting data units from the registry, which 
doesn‟t provide a complete picture of the registry files an investigator needs to gather their 
evidence from. 
 
An alternative method would involve accurately extracting the hive files first, which would 
then allow a straightforward method to carve the required data from registry files. But, as 
previously mentioned, there is little work available which focuses on how to recover 
Windows registry files. Two issues stand in the way of understanding the process needed to 
properly recover these files: 
a) Microsoft has yet to publish any related work which details the specifics of how the 
registry data structures are organized on the computer‟s disk. 
b) File fragmentation of the registry files is extremely common even after 
defragmentation software has been run. In fact, registry hive files can be fragmented 
into as many as one hundred pieces.  
 
All Windows system related files, including the registry files, are stored on disk in a 
specific range which is fairly easy to locate and then extract in a short time period. Contrary 
to Window‟s system files, application and user files can be stored randomly across the 
device‟s storage media. Locating and identifying these files can be a very lengthy process, 




doubles. At the time of this writing, home users have access to terabyte size storage devices 
and some enterprise businesses are backing up petabyte of data. Using the previously 
mentioned tools, a forensic investigator would simply not have enough time to analyze all 
unallocated space of the computer clusters making up the new forms of cloud computing. 
 
A process that can first scan and classify the type of data stored in the unallocated space 
would help to overcome some of these time constraints. Once the data is classified, the 
investigator can choose which type of data is of interest and then focus on recovering only 
that data. For example, Figure 2.4 shows both allocated and unallocated clusters on a 
section of a computer disk. The unallocated clusters in this Figure have been classified 
showing that they contain data from various types of files including jpg, mp3 and pdf files. 
Once the information has been classified, it can then be grouped together and the data of 
interest can then be extracted for further analysis. 
classify
Allocated clusters Unallocated .jpg clusters
Unallocated .mp3 clusters Unallocated .pdf clusters
 





Calhoun et al [28] and Veenman [29] published methods which are both based on this 
methodology. That is, one which tries to predict file types from within file embedded 
meta-data. These can be a big asset for an investigator trying to carve files from large 
storage media. More specifically, Calhoun et al [28] investigated two algorithms to 
determine the type of a file fragment. One uses linear discrimination and the other uses the 
longest common subsequences. The linear discrimination is a statistical classification 
method used to classify individuals into groups based on Kolmogorov complexity. The 
idea of the longest common subsequences is that cluster of data with the same file type, 
probably have similar longer substrings. Close to their design, Cor J. Veenman uses the 
statistical data of the clusters to predict the file types. Basically, Veenman uses the 
statistical content of the cluster to get the content features. Based on the content features, 
the cluster prediction problem becomes a classification problem. After sufficient clusters of 
a file have been extracted, a specialized model can be established to help locate the rest of 
the file‟s cluster based on analysis of the already recovered clusters.  
 
These papers, theoretically, are fundamental to the practice. But there is a huge gap 
between these designs and the requirements of law enforcement. In reality, a forensic 
investigator may have millions of files pending analysis. If their files are deleted and still 
exist in unallocated space, it is inefficient to use the previously mentioned tools or designs 




Instead, a fast lookup system should be built which directly searches through unallocated 
space and compares its contents directly with the information stored within the police 
databases. The tool COFEE is developed for the investigator to do the preliminary analysis 
at the crime scene, but unfortunately, COFEE becomes ineffective in cases where forensic 
data has been permanently deleted on the suspect‟s device, i.e. emptying the recycle bin or 
if the operating system has removed as well. Because of these drawbacks of COFEE, we 
propose our design in the later section as a supplement of COFEE, to search the unallocated 
space of a storage device which no longer has a file system.  
 
Based on the above description of the available tools, there is still a gap between what the 
forensic investigator needs and what is available. Most of these works are suitable for 
analyzing and carving the files within a lab environment, and many still focus on only 
bi-fragmented files. Even though many works consider the validation of a file after it has 
been recovered, seldom do papers discuss files recovered with missing fragments or how to 
deal with file fragments that have been damaged or overwritten.  
 
In our research, we design a tool which is portable, but more importantly a tool that is fast 
enough to investigate digital storage media at the crime scene, particularly unallocated 
space on digital storage media. To meet these requirements, we introduce the efficient data 




storage efficiency and faster lookups. Moreover, we use group testing techniques along 
with statistics about the size of gaps between two fragments of a file for effectively 
searching the unallocated space in an effort to extract fragmented files. This tool will be 
able to discover multiple fragmented files and files not stored in a sequential order. False 
positives can be controlled in the design as well. Also, we design an algorithm for 
recovering the Windows registry file based on its internal structure and fragment 
characteristics, which are discovered using a survey of 50 computers with different 
versions of the Windows Operating system. Most importantly, in our designs, we 

















In this section we will briefly introduce bloom filters and fingerprint hash table, which 
serve as important background of the proposed forensics analytical method for 
unallocated disk space. Then, we will discuss file fragmentation and file deletion in file 
systems.  
 
3.1.1 Bloom Filter  
 
A bloom filter is a hash based space efficient data structure used for querying a large set of 
items to determine whether a given item is a member of the set. When we query an item in 
the bloom filter, false negative matches are not possible but false positives occur with a 
pre-determined acceptable false positive rate. A bloom filter is developed by inserting a 
given set of items E = {e1, …, en} into a bit array of m bits B=(b1, b2 ... bm), where each bit is 




in the set to produce k hash values (V1, V2 … Vk) and all corresponding bits in the bit array 
are set to 1 as illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
 
The main properties of a bloom filter are as follows [30]: (1) the space for storing the 
Bloom filter is very small; (2) the time to query whether an element is in the Bloom filter is 
the same and is not affected by the number of items in the set; (3) false negatives are 
impossible, and (4) false positives are possible, but the rate can be controlled. As one 
space-efficient data structure for representing a set of elements, bloom filter has been 
widely used in web cache sharing [31, 32], package routing [33], and so on. 
Item
H1 H5 HkH4H3H2 ……
0000000010000000001000010000000001000000……00000000000100000010
b1 b9 b19 b24 b34 bm-1bm-8
 
Figure 3.1 m-bit standard Bloom filter 
 











                            (3.2) 
Where P(x) is a perfect hash function which maps each element e∈E to an element at the 
unique location in an array of size n, F(x) is a hash function which calculates a fingerprint 
with   = [log1/ε] bits of a given element e∈E, ε is the probability of a false positive,   ι 
denotes a bit stream with a length  . For example, given the desired false positive 
probability of ε=2
-10
, only 10 bits are needed to represent each element. In this case, the 
required storage space for the scenario in Table 1.1 is 2.98GB, which takes much less space 
compared to traditional cryptographic hash methods. 
 
3.1.2 File Fragmentation 
 
When a file is newly created in an operating system, the file system attempts to store the file 
contiguously in a series of sequential clusters large enough to hold the entire file in order to 
improve the performance of file retrieval and other operations later on. Most files are stored 
in this manner but some conditions like low disk space cause files to become fragmented 
over time and split over two or more sequential blocks of clusters. Garfinkel‟s corpus 




regions around the world provided the first published findings about fragmentation 
statistics in real-world datasets [9]. According to his findings, fragmentation rates were not 
evenly distributed amongst file systems and hard drives and roughly half of all the drives in 
the corpus contained only contiguous files. Only 6% of all the recoverable files were 
fragmented at all with bi-fragmented files accounting for about 50% of fragmented files 
and files fragmented into three and as many as one thousand fragments accounted for the 
remaining 50%. 
 
3.1.3 File Deletion 
 
When a file is permanently deleted (e.g. by emptying the recycle bin), the file system no 
longer provides any means for recovering the file and marks the clusters previously 
assigned to the deleted file as unallocated and available for reuse. Although the file appears 
to have been erased, its data is still largely intact until it is overwritten by another file. For 
example, in the FAT file system each file and directory is allocated a data structure called a 
directory (DIR) entry that contains the file name, size, starting cluster address and other 
metadata. If a file is large enough to require multiple clusters, only the file system has the 
information to link one cluster to another in the right order to form a cluster chain. When 




actual contents of the data clusters [35]. It is therefore possible to recover important files 
during an investigation by analyzing the unallocated space of the device. 
 
3.2 Proposed algorithm for evidence extraction from unallocated space 
 
In this section we will first introduce our proposed data structure based on bloom filters and 
hash trees for efficiently storing the alert database and fast lookup in the database. Then we 
will present an effective forensic analytical method for unallocated disk space even in the 
presence of file fragmentation.  
 
3.2.1 Constructing Alert Database 
 
Law enforcement agencies around the world collect and store large sets of inappropriate 
images like child pornography, and can be used to build up a database, also known as 
alert database, to assist in the arrests of perpetrators that possess the images, as well as to 






Now, we will introduce how to build up an alert database in an efficient way. In order to 
insert a file into an alert database, we first divide the file size by 4096 bytes to create an 
array of data items {e1, e2, e3 … en} that are fed into P(x) so that we can map each element 
ei ∈ E(1≤i≤n), to a unique location in another array of size n. It is worth noting that file 
cluster size can be different for different file systems. For simplicity, we assume the cluster 
size is 4 KB. Later on, we store the fingerprint   = [log1/ε] bits which is the F(x) value of a 
given element in each unique location. The process is repeated for the rest of the data items 
of each file; finally each file takes n*   bits in the alert database. In this manner, we store all 
the files into the alert database. 
 
3.2.2 Hash Tree Indexing 
 
In order to get rapid random lookups and efficient access of records from the alert database, 
we construct a Merkle tree based on all cluster fingerprints of the files processed by the 
fingerprint hash table and index each fingerprint as a single unit. In the Merkle tree, data 
records are stored only in leaf nodes but internal nodes are empty. Indexing the cluster 
fingerprints is easily achieved in the alert database using existing indexing algorithms, for 
example binary searching. The hash tree can be computed online while the indexing should 




example of an alert database with m files divided into 8 clusters each. Each file in the 
database has a hash tree and all the cluster fingerprints are indexed. In a file hash tree, the 
value of the internal nodes and file roots can be computed online quickly due to the fact that 













cluster1 cluster2 cluster3 cluster4 cluster5 cluster6 cluster7 cluster8
F(7)F(3) F(2)F(1)F(4) F(5) F(6)F(8)
F(1) F(8)F(3) F(4)F(2) F(5) F(6) F(7)
Fingerprint Hash Table
cluster1 cluster2 cluster3 cluster4 cluster5 cluster6 cluster7 cluster8
F(7)F(3) F(2)F(1) F(4)F(5) F(6) F(8)









3.2.3 Group Testing for Evidence Extraction 
 
Group testing was first introduced by Dorfman [37] in World War II to provide efficient 
testing of millions of blood samples from US Army recruits being screened for venereal 
diseases. Dorfman realized that it was inefficient to test each individual blood sample and 
proposed to pool a set of blood samples together prior to running the screening test. If the 
test comes back negative, then all the samples that make up the pool are cleared of the 
presence of the venereal disease. If the test comes back positive, however, additional tests 
can be performed on the individual blood samples until the infected source samples are 
identified. Group testing is an efficient method for separating out desired elements from a 
massive set using a limited number of tests. We adopt the use of group testing for 
efficiently identifying the fragmentation point of a known target file which is stored on a 
suspect's computer and has been deleted.  
 
From Garfinkel‟s corpus investigation [9], there appears to be a trend in the relationship 
between the file size and the gap between the fragments that make up the file. For example, 
as for JPEG files from the corpus investigated by Garfinkel, 16% of recoverable JPEG files 
were fragmented. With bi-fragmented JPEG files, the gap between the fragments were 8, 
16, 24, 32, 56, 64, 240, 256 and 1272 sectors with corresponding file sizes of 4096, 8192, 




Using this information, we can build search parameters for the first sector of the next 
fragment based on the size of the file which we know from the source or alert database. 
 
In limited cases, the file is fragmented into two and more than two fragments. We suppose 
a realistic fragmentation scenario in which fragments are not randomly distributed but have 
multiple clusters sequentially stored. Under these characteristics, we can quickly find out 















Figure 3.3 The relation between the gap and the file size 
 
3.2.4 Description of Algorithm 
 
In this sub-section, we illustrate our proposed forensic analytical method to effectively 
extract evidence from unallocated disk space with the assumption that the deleted file is 




basic algorithm of our proposed scheme. Slack space is the unused space in the last cluster 
for a file. Discussions on cases involving partially overwritten files and slack space 
trimming are presented in Section 3.3.  
 
During forensic analysis when any cluster is extracted from the unallocated space of the 
suspect‟s machine, we compute its fingerprint and search the alert database containing 
indexed cluster fingerprints of known inappropriate files for a match. If no match is found it 
means that the cluster is not part of the investigation and can be safely ignored. Recall that 
the use of fingerprint hash table to calculate the fingerprint guarantees that false negatives 
are not possible. If a match is found in the alert database, then we can proceed to further 
testing to determine if the result is a false positive or a true match. We begin by checking if 
the target cluster is part of a contiguous file by pooling together a group of clusters 
corresponding to the known file size and then computing the root value of the hash tree in 
both the alert database and the target machine. If the root values match, then it means that a 
complete file of forensic interest has been found on the suspect‟s machine. If the root 
values do not match, then the file is fragmented. For non-contiguous files, our next set of 






Finding the fragmentation point of a fragment is achieved by group testing procedures in a 
similar manner as finding contiguous files with the use of root hash values. Rather than 
computing a root value using all the clusters that make up the file, however, we begin with 
a pool of d clusters and calculate its partial root value and then compare it with the partial 
root value from the alert database. If a match is found, we continue adding clusters d at a 
time to the previous pool until a negative result is returned, which indicates that the 
fragmentation point is somewhere in the last d clusters processed. The last d clusters 
processed can then be either divided into two groups (with a size of d/2) and tested, or 
processed one cluster at a time and tested at each stage until the last cluster for that 
fragment, i.e., fragmentation point, is found. 
 
Next, we need to find the first cluster of the next fragment. In order to find the starting 
cluster of the next fragment, we apply statistics about gap distribution introduced in the 
previous section to select a narrow range of clusters to begin searching and perform simple 
binary comparisons of the target cluster fingerprint with the one from the alert database. 
Binary comparisons are very fast and as such we can ignore the time taken for searching for 
the next fragment when calculating the time complexity. If the starting cluster of the next 
fragment cannot be successfully identified based on the gap distribution, brute-force cluster 
search is conducted on the suspect‟s device until a successful match occurs. Afterwards, the 




which separate them as shown in Figure 3.4 to form a single fragment. Verification of a 
match can be performed at this point using the aforementioned method for contiguous files. 
If the test returns a negative result, then we can deduce that the file is further fragmented. 
Otherwise, a complete file of forensic interest that has been fragmented into two pieces (or 
is bi-fragmented) has been found on the suspect‟s machine. 
 
    
         
Logical fragment
 
Figure 3.4 Logical fragment for files of several fragments 
 
For a small percentage (or 3%) of files that are fragmented into three or more pieces, once 
we logically combine detected fragments as a single virtual fragment as illustrated in 
Figure 3.4, the fragmentation point detection of the logical fragment can be achieved by 
group testing procedures and the location of the starting cluster for the third fragment can 
be determined using statistics about the gap between fragments and binary comparisons as 
with bi-fragmented files. The rest of the fragmentation detection algorithm can follow the 
same pattern as bi-fragmented files until the complete file is detected. Figure 3.5 shows the 




Step 1: Scan unallocated space on suspect‟s disk until a match is found;
     Loop: 
Step 2: Check if the file is contiguous or fragmented by comparing 
the root values of hash trees from the alert database and suspect‟s 
disk. If the file is contiguous, break; 
Step 3: Find the fragmentation point by using group testing; 
Step 4: Find the starting cluster of the next fragment based on the 
gap distribution. If not successful, a brute-force search is adopted; 
Step 5: Combine two identified fragments logically by removing 
irrelevant data between these two fragments;
     Loop ends 
Step 6: Evidence is retrieved. 
 
Figure 3.5 The main steps of the algorithm 
 
Next, we will use an example to further illustrate how the proposed algorithm works. 
Suppose the cluster size used in the suspect‟s hard disk is 4KB. One suspicious image is 
stored on suspect‟s disk and the size of the file is 32K bytes. As shown in Figure 3.6, the 
image is fragmented into three pieces, being separately distributed on suspect‟s hard disk. 
This image was later deleted by the suspect. Clusters 1-4 are holding the image clusters C1 
to C4 and clusters 7-9 are used to hold the image clusters C5 to C7 and cluster 12 is holding 
image cluster C8. For this situation, it will be very challenge for existing file carving tools 
to carve out this deleted image due to the fact that this file has been fragmented into more 
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Figure 3.6 The suspect image on unallocated space 
 
First, we scan the disk until we have a match, where C1 is found in unallocated spaces of 
suspect‟s disk. Then we move to Step 2, test if the file is contiguous or fragmented which is 
the beginning of the loop. According to the file size from the alert database, we can group 8 
contiguous clusters together in Figure 3.7 starting from cluster 1, which contain clusters 1 
to 8 on suspect‟s hard disk, and calculate the root hash value of these clusters. Afterwards, 
we compare it with the root hash value calculated from the alert database. The comparing 
result is false because there are two clusters not belonging to the file. Then we know the file 
is fragmented and we go to next step, find out the fragmentation point.  
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According to the binary splitting group testing, we group 4 clusters together physically 
from cluster 1 to cluster 4 and calculate the partial root hash value, and compare it with the 
partial root hash value from the alert database. Although the comparing result is true, but 
we cannot yet confirm whether cluster 4 is the fragmentation point. Then we do further 
analysis, and group these 4 plus half of the half which is 6 clusters, from cluster 1 to cluster 
6 shown in Figure 3.8 (a). Obviously, the result is false. We know the cluster which doesn‟t 
belong to the image is one of the last two clusters, either cluster 5 or 6. In other words, we 
know that the fragmentation point is located at cluster 4 or 5. Then we use binary splitting 
group testing to test 5 clusters, which are the clusters 1 to 5 shown in Figure 3.8 (b). The 
result is also not true. It means that cluster 4 is the fragmentation point.  
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Figure 3.8 (b) Five clusters‟ partial hash tree 
 
After we know cluster 4 is the fragmentation point, we need to find the starting cluster of 
the next fragment, which is cluster 7 that contains the content of C5 of the image. For 
simplicity, we assume that according to the gap distribution, we can locate this cluster very 
quickly. After we find the starting cluster of the second fragment, we logically combine 
these two fragments together and make it to be a virtual contiguous fragment shown in 
Figure 3.9. Later on, we go back to the beginning of the loop, check if the file is a complete 
file or further fragmented by comparing the root hash values from the alert database and the 













Figure 3.9 Eight clusters‟ hash tree after combining 
 
Following the same way, we can locate the fragmentation point, i.e., cluster 9, and the 
starting cluster of the next fragment is cluster 12. At the end, the root hash value of the file 
matches the one from the alert database. Therefore, we can say we find the evidence, a 




In this section we will discuss the effect of false positives from the fingerprint hash table, 
handling unbalanced hash trees caused by an odd number of clusters in a file, and some 






3.3.1 False Positive in Alert database 
 
The Bloom filter and its variants have a possibility of producing false positives where a 
cluster fingerprint from the alert database matches with a cluster fingerprint from the 
suspect‟s device that is actually part of an unrelated legitimate file. However, as an 
excellent space saving solution, the probability of an error can be controlled. In fingerprint 
hash table, the probability of false positive is related to the size of the fingerprint 
representing an item. If the false positive probability is ε, the required size of the fingerprint 
is   = [log1/ ε] bits. For example, given the desired false positive probability of ε = 2-10, 
only 10 bits are needed to represent each element (or cluster). Hence, the false positive ε‟ is 
shown in the function (equation 3.3) when d cluster fingerprints from the alert database 









Figure 3.10 The relationship between the false positive and parameters 
 
From Figure 3.10, we can see the false positive will decrease when d or   increases. As  , 
the size of the cluster fingerprint, or d, the cluster number, increases, the false positive 
decreases, but the storage requirement for alert database increases. Therefore we can 
simply choose the right d and   to control the false positive in order to achieve a good 
balance between the storage requirement and the probability of a false positive. 
 





An unbalanced hash tree will occur in cases where the clusters that form a file do not add up 
to a power of 2. In these cases, we can promote the node up in the tree until a sibling is 
found [38]. For example the file illustrated in Figure 3.11 is divided into 7 clusters and the 
corresponding fingerprints are F(1), F(2), … F(7), but the value F(7) of the seventh cluster 
does not have a sibling. Without being rehashed, we can promote F(7) up until it can be 








Figure 3.11 An example of unbalanced hash tree 
 
3.3.3 Slack Space Trimming 
 
In a digital device, clusters are equal-sized data units typically pre-set by the operating 
system. A file is spread over one or more clusters equal in size or larger than the size of the 
file being stored. This means that often there are unused bytes at the end of the last cluster 




operating system with 4 KB cluster size (4096bytes) and 512 byte sector, a 1236 byte file 
would require one cluster with first 1236 bytes containing file data and the remaining 2560 
bytes are slack space as illustrated in Figure 3.12. The first two sectors of the cluster would 
be filled with file data and only 212 bytes of the third sector would be filled with data with 
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Figure 3.12 Slack space in the cluster 
 
Depending on the file system and operating system, slack space may be padding with zeros, 
may contain data from a previously deleted file or system memory. For files that are not a 
multiple of the cluster size, the slack space is the space after the file footer. Slack space 
would cause discrepancies in the calculated hash value of a file cluster when creating the 
cluster fingerprint. In this work, we are working on the assumption that the file size can be 
determined ahead of time from the information in the law enforcement source (alert) 
database and as a result, slack space can be easily detected and trimmed prior to the 
calculation of the hash values. 
 





As discussed earlier when a file is deleted, the operating system marks the clusters 
belonging to the file as unallocated without actually erasing the data contained in the 
clusters. In some cases some clusters may have since been assigned to other files and 
overwritten with data. In these cases, part of the file may still be recoverable and decisions 
on how many recovered clusters of a file constitute evidence of the prior existence of the 
entire file is up to the law enforcement agencies. For example, a search warrant may 
indicate that thresholds above 40% are sufficient for seizure of the device for more 
comprehensive analysis at an offsite location. 
Clusters are not matched
Clusters are matched
 
Figure 3.13 The potential evidence 
 
Suppose the file in Figure 3.13 has four fragments and that the colored clusters 
(fragments 1 and 3) are still available on the suspect disk while the white clusters 
(fragments 2 and 4) have been overwritten with other information. Once the first fragment 
is detected using the techniques discussed in Section 3.2, detecting the second fragment 
will require the time consuming option of searching every single cluster when the 




the second fragment and we can conclusively say that the fragment is missing, we can 
either continue searching for the third cluster or prioritize these types of cases with 
missing fragments to the end after all other possible lucrative searches have been 
exhausted. 
 
3.4 Complexity Analysis 
 
Unlike the traditional way which used to identify invalid samples on large sample spaces 
with the minimal number of validation and verification tests, in our application, the 
objective of group testing is to efficiently identify the fragmentation point of a known 
target file which is stored on a suspect's computer and has been deleted. 
Obviously, if a file is not fragmented and stored contiguously, the computational 
complexity of the proposed algorithm is O(1). In the following, we will discuss the 
complexity of the proposed algorithm when deleted files on suspects‟ hard disks are 
fragmented. 
Even though the computational complexity of group testing for a general purpose has not 
been determined [39], several group testing algorithms have been studied in [40], including 
individual testing, binary splitting, and Li‟s s-stage algorithm. Table 3.1 gives the bound 




group testing algorithms. Specifically, n is the number of clusters which a file occupies and 
m is the number of segments which a file has. 
Table 3.1 The number of required tests for different group testing algorithms 
Algorithm Tests (m=2) Tests (m>2) 
Individual testing n-1 n-1 
Binary splitting ┌log(n)┐ (m-1)┌log(n)┐ 
Li‟s s-stage Algorithm 
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Figure 3.15 Enlarged part of Figure 3.14 
 
Figure 3.14 shows the number of tests (hash value comparison) required as n changes. 
Figure 3.15 shows enlarged image when the cluster number of the file is between 1 and 3. 
From Figure 3.15 we can see, when the cluster number is less than 3, the individual testing 
is faster than the binary splitting. However, the binary splitting algorithm is the most 
efficient algorithm when files are bigger. In reality, an image file can contain up to several 
MB or the number of the clusters needed is larger. Hence the binary splitting algorithm is 
the best group testing method for our application scenario. In sum, for a file with m 




Chapter 4 File Structure based Carving Algorithm for Windows Registry 
 
4.1 Windows Registry 
 
In this section, we first briefly introduce Windows Registry, including its hierarchical 
structure, Hive File, and hive bins (HBINs). 
 
In Windows, the registry is made up by a set of discrete files called hives, also known as 
registry hive files or hive file [41]. Each hive contains a set of keys, which are organized 
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4.1.1 Hive File Organization 
 
Each hive is divided into a set of allocation units (or blocks or clusters), where the first 
one is called base block with a signature “regf” in its header and the rest are organized 
into a set of hive bins (HBINs). Each HBIN can be made up by either one or several 
blocks and always start with a unique signature “hbin”. HBINs are linked together 
through length and offset fields defined in their headers. In addition, each HBIN 
implicitly indicates the starting point of the next HBIN through its size in its header. In 
Figure 4.2, the dotted line arrows in the logical layout show a HBIN links from itself to 
its next one. More importantly, from the first HBIN, 4 bytes in each HBIN header are 
used to clarify the offset to the first HBIN where the field contains all zeroes for the first 
HBIN, indicating this is the first HBIN. The solid line arrows in the logical layout in the 
Figure 4.2 show the reference points between each HBIN and the first HBIN. In addition 
to the HBIN header, it is made up by a group of cells, which are the basic containers used 
to store the registry data and linked together through its offset field. The HBIN layout in 
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From the logical layout, we can easily know the hive file internal reference information 
can be used to recover deleted or lost hive files. Moreover, the HBIN layout provides us 
further sufficient information to help us cross the balk when we recover the fragmented 
hive file. In the following, we will explain the further details inside the HBIN.  
 
4.1.2 HBIN Structure 
 
4.1.2.1 HBIN Header Data Structure 
 
Different from base block, the bin header always has 0x20 bytes which includes the HBIN 
signature “hbin”, the offset to the first HBIN, the size of this HBIN and the timestamp, 
shown in Figure 4.3. The offset from each HBIN to the first HBIN indicates the HBIN‟s 
logical location in this hive file. The bin size can be interpreted as an offset to the next bin. 
In other words, bins are chained together by the bin size in that each bin points to the bin 
that follows. The timestamp in the first HBIN is the same as the hive file header; 
unfortunately, we can only find the first HBIN has the same timestamp as the base block, 
while the rest of HBINs are set to 0x00000000. In summary, the offset to the first HBIN 
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Figure 4.3 HBIN header data structure 
 
Here is an example from a DEFAULT hive file, Figure 4.4, which shows the relationship 
between HBINs. This DEFAULT file has 5 fragments and every HBIN occupies one 
cluster where the cluster size is 4096 bytes. In the first fragment, after the base block, the 1
st
 
HBIN is located at cluster 204397 and the last cluster of this fragment is 204451 as well as 
it represents the 55
th
 HBIN. The offset to the first HBIN in 55
th
 HBIN is 0x36000 bytes. In 
the second fragment, it starts at cluster 18976 which is located in front of the first fragment 
on hard disk and it is the 56
th
 HBIN of the hive file. The offset to the first HBIN in this 
HBIN is 0x37000 bytes. If we do the proof calculation, 0x36000 and 0x37000 divided by 





 HBIN in the HBIN order. Furthermore, from this example, we can know that the 
fragment can be stored out of order on the hard disk and the offset to the first HBIN is the 
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4.1.2.2 HBIN Data Structure 
 
Besides the HBIN header, the rest of HBIN is made up by reference related cells. The 
cell, which is the unit to store the data in HBIN, is variable-length but is a multiple of 
8 bytes. A hive file has a number of different cells: key cells, sub-key list cells, value 
list cells, value cells and the security description cell. Table 4.1 shows the signature of 
different cells. We will detail the cell information in the sub-sections. 
Table 4.1 The signature of different cells 
Cell Names Signatures
Key cell nk







In each hive file, the reference point is the first HBIN offset value. In each HBIN, all 
cells list out the necessary related cells offset based on the reference point. According 
to the offset and reference point, the system can easily locate and extract the 
information which requires access rights for the user [42]. Figure 4.5 shows the data 








Value  1 Value 2
  Offset to: 
Sub-key list cell 1; Value list cell 1







 Sub-key list cell 2; Value list cell 2; Security 
descriptor cell 2; Parent key cell 1st key;
Offset to:












 Sub-key list cell 3; Value list cell 3; Security 
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Figure 4.5 The data structure of HBIN 
 
Next, we will introduce several important data structures in the HBIN. 
 
a. Key Cells 
 
The key cell plays a significant role in the hive file structure which contains all the 
reference information of the cell and ties all cells together. Each hive file contains a 
registry tree, which has a key that serves as the root of the tree, so people call it the 
root key cell. Actually, the regedit.exe shows the relationship between the hive file 
and keys are not straightforward. In other words, the root keys do not exist on the hard 
disk [24]. But from the survey, we found that there is a key cell always following the 
first HBIN header in hive files. We call it the 1
st
 key cell. Then the system constructs 
the hive file from the 1
st
 key cell. In particular, the key cells record the offset to the 
sub-key list cells, the value list cells and the security description cell. In addition, the 


























 key cell, and according to the reference to sub-key list, we can draw out 
the whole registry tree of this hive file. Figure 4.7 shows an example of key cell 
relationships - how the key cells are connected together by the sub-key offsets in the 
sub-key lists and the offset to the parent key which is part of a SAM hive. Clearly, the 
key cell at 0x53B692F0 references the sub-key list at offset 0x2658, and based on the 
first HBIN offset 0x53B67000, you can find out the sub-key list at offset 
0X53B69658 which lists the offset to three key cells. When you look into any one of 
the three sub-keys, you can find at the field of the parent key offset that the offset 








































Figure 4.7 Key cell relationships 
 
But when a key does not have a sub-key, the field of the number of sub-keys will set 
to 0x00000000 and the sub-key list offset will set to 0xffffffff. In Figure 4.7, the key 
cells are in red color if they do not have further sub-keys. The field for a number of 
values and value list offset will follow the same rules. At the end of the day, when the 
sub-key list offset is set to 0xffffffff and number of sub-keys is set to 0x00000000 in 
each key cell, it means this HIVE file ends. 
 





In order to search, locate and extract the sub-keys quickly and correctly, the key cell 
records the sub-key list cell which is sorted in order by the hash value of the cell name. 
Then, the key cell references the sub-key cells through the sub-key list. However, the 
key cell organized is not in a sequential order which means the sub-keys can exist in 
front of their parent key on the hard disk. The value-lists are similar to the sub-key 
lists which reference value records, but the value-lists are not sorted in order.  
 
c. Security Descriptor Cells 
 
The structure of security descriptor cell contains the security information associated 
with an object. The cell records include a short header followed by a Windows 
security descriptor which defines permission and ownership for local values or 
sub-keys. Applications use this structure to set and query an object's security status. 
Multiple key cells can share the same security descriptor cells. In Figure 7, following 
the red strength line, all the „nk‟ signed cells in the image reference the security 
descriptor cell at offset 0x53B60178. Actually, in this hive file, there are only two 
security descriptor cells which the 1
st
 key cell has one and the rest of the key cells 
share another one. 
 





In this section, we study fragmentation issues in Windows Hive Files through a study, 
which was based on a survey of 50 Windows systems with the NTFS (New 
Technology File System) file system, where NTFS is the standard file system of 
Windows systems. 
 
The registry is the most frequently updated in the Windows system in that it holds all 
the configuration data about the hardware devices and software programs. As a result, 
it is not unusual to see that the Windows registry files are fragmented. Theoretically, 
the fragmentation can happen anywhere in the hive files. But according to the 
Microsoft system storage strategy, the data are filled in the cluster logically. 
According to the drive size nowadays, the cluster size is bigger than the hive block 
size [43]. In other words, the fragmentation can just happen at the end of a cluster.  
 
First, we introduce a study conducted by us and present statistics about the incidence of 
file fragmentation on actual file systems in which we try to summarize some 
characteristics to help us recover the hive file. We investigated 50 systems in total, 20 of 
which were Windows XP, 12 systems were Windows Vistas, 13 systems were 
Windows 7 and the remaining 5 were Windows 2003 servers and Windows 2000. Table 




































From table 4.3, we can know that most of the fragmentation happen in software and 
system hive file, because these hive files are always deleted or changed by the user. The 
other files tend to be the same as they are initiated when the file was created by 
Microsoft.  




Software NtuserSystem Dfault SAM UsrClass
Windows 2003 
Server/2000


















According to the survey, Windows Registry files could be fragmented into as many as 
one hundred pieces which make recovery of deleted/lost registry file extremely hard. 
Moreover, these fragments are stored out of order in the hard disk, which increases the 
difficulty of recovery. In addition, most of the HBINs are one cluster, but there are a 




happens at the end of the cluster [22, 43]. From our survey, we find that the 
fragmentation do as happen at the end of the cluster. However, in Windows registry 
hive files, when the HBIN size equals the cluster size, the fragmentation happens at the 
end of the cluster or HBIN, but when the HBIN size occupies over two clusters, the 
fragmentation can happen in the middle of HBIN which is at the end of the cluster.  
1) Scenario A: The fragmentation happens at the end of previous HBIN (Figure 4.8). 
Most of cases are under this situation, and we can easily infer the fragmentation 












Figure 4.8 The fragmentation between HBINs 
 
2) Scenario B: In rare cases, the fragmentation is in the middle of one HBIN (Figure 
4.9). In this case, except the HBIN header that has the information which is the 
offset to the first HBIN and the HBIN size, the rest of block in this HBIN are just 
filled with data. In other words, we cannot deduce the fragmentation point 
according to previously mentioned characters. What we can do is look for the 
fragmentation point and the starting cluster according to the relationship among the 














Figure 4.9 The fragmentation in HBIN 
 
Moreover, in most fragmented hive files, the first piece is always very big. We suppose 
the system initially allocates a big space for each hive file, but as the operation unfolds 
the space is not enough for holding the data. Since operating on the system requires 
loading new information and data, the system tries to allocate some new space for the 
file. These spaces are distributed arbitrarily on the hard disk, but sizes are quite small 
and most of which are no more than 100 clusters and tend to be the same. In other words, 
the system tries to allocate the same space for the following fragments. From the survey, 
we can know 48% of the operating system hive files do not have a single fragmented 
file; 52% of the system‟s hive files have various fragments from one to hundreds. Table 









Table 4.4 The fragment size 
Fragment size(clusters) # Fragment 
1 -- 32 109 
33 -- 64 298 
65 -- 96 41 
97 -- 128 11 
129 -- ∞ 14 
 
According to the survey results and the internal structure of the hive file, we can design 
the following algorithm for recovering the fragmented hive files. An effective file 
carving algorithm is based on Windows registry files‟ internal structure, which will be 
detailed in the next sub-section. 
 
4.3 File Structure based Carving Algorithm for Windows Registry 
 
In this section, we propose an effective carving algorithm for Windows registry files 
based on the internal structure and unique patterns of storage concluded from our 
study. 
 
Figure 4.10 shows the main flow of the algorithm. In the following, we will detail the 






For i  0 to n do lookup “regf”                      // n is the total clusters
LR: For j  0 to m do
If  S[j] + F[j] = F[j+1]   then              // S[j] is the size of HBIN[j]
 //  F[j] is the offset of HBIN[j] to 1stHBIN
                                              // F[j+1] is the offset of HBIN[j+1] to 1stHBIN
                               Two clusters are contiguous  
                               Return the hive file is contiguous
    Else
The hive file is fragmented between HBIN F[j] and F[j+1]
  If HBIN F[j] is a complete HBIN
   For k  0 to n do lookup for HBIN F[j+1]
   If HBIN F[k]  = F[j+1]  then
  HBIN F[j+1] is the candidate, Return to R&V
   Else this fragment can be overwritten or damaged 
  Jump to Initial
           Else
    For p  0 to n search the key cell at set offset in the HBIN
             If NK in HBIN F[k] +/- offset from Sub-key list = Nk in HBIN F[k+1]
                   It is the candidate of HBIN F[n+1], Return to R&V
      Else this fragment can be overwritten or damaged
Jump to Initial
R&V : Reassemble HBIN F[j] & F[j+1]
        If the HIVE file is a complete, return to Initial
        Else Return to LR
End
 
Figure 4.10 File structure based file carving algorithm 
 
Step 1: Find the Base Block of the Hive File 
Scan the disk image, and if a cluster begins with a signature “regf” and the file name is 
one of the hive files, this cluster is the base block of a hive file.  
 
Step 2: Check Whether the Hive File is Contiguous or Fragmented 
Normally, the HBINs have the magic number “hbin” and all the HBINs will follow the 
base block. Every HBIN stores their size S(n) in the header. Based on this structure, we 
can use the offset of HBIN at H[n+1] to minus the offset of HBIN at H[n], so that we can 




O(l) = O(H[n+1]) – O(H[n])        (4.1) 
 
O(l) = S(n)                   (4.2) 
 
In other words, if offset and the HBIN size satisfy the equations 4.1 and 4.2, these two 
HBINs are contiguous, shows in Figure 4.11 Repeat the same way, we can know 








(n+1) bin size S(n+1)
 
Figure 4.11 The contiguous HBINs 
 
For the intact hive file, it will be easy for us to extract the data and recover the file. But 
for the fragmented hive file, it is difficult to locate the fragmentation and to recover the 
hive file, because from the survey we know that these fragments are distributed 
arbitrarily on the hard disk. The next step is to identify the ending cluster of the 
fragmentation. 
 
Step 3: Identify the Fragmentation Point 
We need to consider two situations when we try to find out the fragmentation point. 




frequently fragmented cluster numbers. After this, we can check the results in the 
following conditions. 
 
Firstly, the fragmentation happens at the end of one HBIN. If the hive file is fragmented, 
according to the HBIN structure, we can know the size of this HBIN. Moreover, the last 
cell of a HBIN fills out the remaining space of a bin. In other words, there is not any 
slack space in a HBIN [27]. Then, according to the size of the HBIN, we can trim this 
fragment out at the end of this HBIN to which this HBIN size offset is pointed. Then, 
we can extract this fragment out.  
 
Secondly, the fragmentation happens between the clusters in HBIN. If the hive file is 
fragmented in the middle of one HBIN which is made up by several clusters, we cannot 
locate the fragmentation point through the connection between the HBINs. However, 
the key cell contains information which references the parent key cell and the sub-key 
cells distributed in all HBINs of one hive file. If the reference between the key cells has 
no relationship, we can know the fragmentation happens in the middle of the two 
HBINs.  
 
Step 4: Find the Beginning of Next Fragment Beginning Block 
To identify the fragmentation point, we also need to consider two situations when we 




Firstly, the fragmentation happens at the end of one HBIN. If we find the fragmentation 
point of previous fragment, the next fragment of this file will start with the signature 
“hbin”. Moreover, the offset to the first HBIN is sequential following the previous 
offset. Hence we can scan the whole disk and try to find the offset value which is 
matched with the offset for the next HBIN. It is possible to find more than one HBIN 
with the same offset, but we can eliminate those in the sequence and keep those which 
are not following the previous HBIN. 
 
Secondly, the fragmentation happens between the clusters in HBIN. When the fragment 
point of the previous fragment is found, the following fragment point of this file will 
contain a key cell which the offset to the parent or sub-key list of the key must relative 
to the previous key cell. According to this, we can search the starting cluster from the 
disk. 
 
In order to keep a low false positive, we introduce the validation algorithm to make sure 
the fragments that we found belong to the same file.  
 
Step 5: Reassembly and Validation 
Reassemble those extracted fragment together, and if the field of the number of 
sub-keys in all ending key cells are 0x00000000 and the sub-key list offsets are 




way to make sure all the fragments which we found belong to the one hive file. We 
can reconstruct the tree of this hive file. If all the references among the HBIN header 
and the key cells do not have a single break, this hive file is the right one. 
 
4.4 Discussions  
 
In this section we will discuss some special cases such as the cell size over HBIN size, 
several HBINs missed and a potential clue to help us recover the deleted/lost Windows 
registry hive files.  
  
4.4.1 Cell Size over HBIN Size 
 
If a value cell size is bigger than the block size and it takes more than two blocks in a 
HBIN, the fragmentation happens in the middle of the value cell [44]. In Figure 4.12, 
for example, the grey colored value cell starts from the 1
st
 block until the beginning of 
the 3
rd
 block. If the fragmentation happens at the end of the 1
st
 block, we cannot locate 
the fragment point according to the algorithm in that we cannot get any helpful 
information from the 2
nd






1st block 2nd block 3rd block
 
Figure 4.12 The cell size is bigger than one block 
 
4.4.2 Missing HBINs 
 
We can recover some HBINs, but few HBINs cannot be allocated in that those HBINs 
may be overwritten or damaged by the system. In this case, we can set a threshold value 
according to the file size or HBIN quantity. If the extracted HBINs over a set value or 
threshold value, we can take it as a complete file when we can get value information 
from it. 
 
4.4.3 A Potential Clue: Security Descriptor Cell 
 
Security descriptor cell can be used for looking up the fragment or validation in that 
multiple key cells can share the same security descriptor cell. But at the beginning of 
the survey, we did not think about recording how the security descriptor cell relates to 
the key cells. It can be another clue like in the example SAM hive file, which all key 




Chapter 5 Conclusions and Future Work 
 
5.1 Summary of Research Work 
 
In our research, we realize that computer forensics provides forensic accounting 
services, conducts fraud investigations, and assists counseling in litigating civil and 
criminal cases based on locating resident, hidden, or deleted data from the computer. 
File carving as a technique is a Swiss Army Knife in computer forensics which can 
help us overcome the problems which cannot be handled by those traditional data 
based on file system metadata recovery tools. Even though many related works have 
been done on carving different files in distinct situations, lots of problems still exist 
and need to be solved. Based on related work, we conclude the main problems during 
file carving and some drawbacks in these approaches. In order to solve the practical 
problems, we propose our designs to supplement a famous forensic tool COFEE to 
investigate unallocated space on the hard disk at the crime scene and introduce a way 
to carve the Windows registry hive files to help investigators extract more useful 
information. 
 
Specifically, in our research, we propose a new approach to store large amounts of data 




we use hash trees to efficiently query the existence of files of interest in the Bloom filter, 
and apply group testing to detect the potential fragmentation point of the file. The gap 
distribution statistics between the file fragments was further applied to narrow down the 
region which was searched for the starting cluster of the next fragment. This approach 
allows us to quickly query for relevant files from the suspect‟s device during a 
preliminary analysis at the crime scene. After successful detection of target file using 
preliminary forensic tools that are fast and efficient, a warrant for further time 
consuming comprehensive analysis can be granted. 
 
As a secondary investigation, we propose an approach to carve the registry hive file 
without any system metadata when the hive file is either contiguous or fragmented. 
From related papers and tutorials, we clarify part of the interior structure of the hive file. 
Due to the limited information of the Windows registry hive file, we did a survey from 
50 computers to verify previous works and most importantly, we supplemented more 
details to construe the structure and the fragment characteristics based on the statistics 
we gathered from the survey. Based on a brute force search algorithm, we can 
accurately extract the registry hive files which offer forensic specialists a whole picture 
of the Windows registry and help them efficiently locate the information that is likely to 





5.2 Summary of Key Outcomes and Contributions 
  
Specifically, the contributions of the research in the efficient evidence extracting 
method are twofold. First, we propose efficient data structures based on hash trees and 
Fingerprint Hash Table (FHT) to achieve both better storage efficiency and faster 
lookups. The FHT is a space-efficient data structure that is used to test the existence of 
a given element from a known set. Also, the hash tree indexing structure ensures that 
the lookups are fast and efficient. Second, we apply group testing technique along 
with statistics about the size of gaps between two fragments of a file for effectively 
searching the unallocated space of the suspect device to extract fragmented files that 
were permanently deleted. The contributions in the novel file carving algorithm for 
Windows registry files lie in: First, we did a survey based on 50 computers installed 
different systems to verify hive file structure and we supplemented more new 
discovered details to clarify the structure and the fragment characteristics based on the 
statistic from the survey to help us get a more accurate recovery result. Based on the 
survey result, we propose a novel file carving algorithm for Windows registry files. 
 





Computer forensics use the updated technology to analyze, glean and demonstrate the 
evidence needed for law enforcement officers in civil or criminal courts to convict those 
suspected crimes. In this thesis, we proposed an efficient evidence extracting method 
from unallocated space which is based on hash operation. The main drawback of hash 
based methods which detect similar files is that files of investigative interest cannot be 
modified. It is highly possible that criminals may manipulate improper files to avoid 
being caught by using tools introduced in this work. In the future, we plan to address 
this issue by adopting fuzzing-hashing function [45, 46, 47].  
 
Furthermore, in computer forensics, file carving is an essential tool which provides the 
fundamental technology to help the forensic specialist extract the wanted data. In the 
future, we will develop a universal framework which can be used to carve different 
types of files such as wav, mp3, xml from unallocated space based on their own unique 
internal structure so that we can facilitate analysis and extract various files from 
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